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ABSTRACT
Public health plays an important, albeit often unnoticed, role in
protecting and promoting the health ofpopulations. The activities of
public health are complex, performed by multiple professionals, and
range from the innocuous to the intrusive. Ethical analyses. in public
health reflect some of this complexity and fragmentation, with no one
approach able to capture the full range of ethical considerations
raised by public health activities. There are however, good reasons
why we should pursue such analyses. Providing a robust ethical
framework for public health may promote the identity and function of
public health, address some of the shortcomings of utilitarianism,
and help to combat the threat that public health faces through lack of
political will in many parts of the world.
In this paper I argue that Alasdair Maclntyre's account of
practices and virtues can make a valuable contribution to public
health ethics. The first part of the paper argues that public health
may properly be described as the type of practice that provides an
arena for the exercise of virtues. This is followed by an analysis of
the three virtues of honesty, courage and justice in public health
practice. Using virtue theory captures morally important elements of
public health and helps to maintain awareness of significant moral
values in the practice ofpublic health. Such awareness is crucial in
maintaining and defending the integrity ofpublic health.
Introduction
The activities of public health encompass a wide range of ethical
issues that are subject to increasing interest and analysis. This is
evident in a number of ways. There is steadily growing debate about
public health ethics, particularly in public health journals.'
Professional associations are developing codes of ethics for public
health, such as that published by the American Public Health
Association. 2 Public health ethics is starting to appear on conference
agendas, either as the main focus or as part of wider programs.3
Some of these analyses focus on the shortcomings of clinical
ethics in providing a framework for public health. 4 Other contributions
have included rights-based analyses,' communitarian accounts,' and
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applications of virtue ethics to public health.7 Empirical research has
identified the ethical challenges of public health from the perspective of
practitioners. 8
One common thread from this material is that public health is
complex. The workforce is often fragmented, and the achievements go
largely unnoticed by the population and politicians alike, making public
health very much the Cinderella of the health care family. If this is the
case, a plausible account of public health ethics may be of value not
only for any utility it may bring in addressing the ethical challenges,
but also for its role in consolidating the identity of public health as an
area of activity with its own moral authority and expectations. A strong
moral identity for public health would offer some unity to the wide
range of professionals involved in public health activities, foster greater
public understanding of the role of public health, and provide some
justification for demands on both the public's trust and its financial
resources. Given the potentially intrusive nature of some public health
activities, with their threat of police powers, being trustworthy (and
being seen to be trustworthy) is particularly important.
As well as these general reasons, there are two further reasons
why there is a current need for a strong moral identity for public
health. First, the historical framework offered by utilitarianism has
become increasingly inadequate in the face of changing patterns of
morbidity and mortality. In the past, large health gains for populations
could be achieved through measures such as universal vaccination,
clean water and sewerage, or child health initiatives. In wealthy
countries, the utilitarian calculus no longer serves so well. People
already have relatively long life expectancies, the threats of epidemics
have retreated, and the multifactorial nature of many of our chronic
diseases has limited the scope of relatively simple population-level
interventions. In addition, growing emphasis upon patients' rights and
personal autonomy have decreased the power of justifications based
upon the greatest good for the greatest number. The waning of
utilitarianism leaves public health without a clearly identifiable and
widely accepted moral framework.
A second reason as to why we need a strong moral identity for
public health at present is because, in many countries around the
world, public health is under serious threat through lack of funds, lack
of trained personnel and lack of political will. 9 The people most affected
by failures of public health are those who are already vulnerable
through various forms of disadvantage, creating a strong moral
imperative to try to reverse this decline. Raising the moral prome of
public health may contribute to building a robust international identity
for the public health community, which in turn may be a powerful tool
in combating these threats.
In this article, I argue that public health fits well within
MacIntyre's account of practices and virtues. IQ This approach has merit
in that, on MacIntyre's account, virtues are linked to practices,
communal identities, and to the traditions from which they derive. This
linkage of moral frameworks with practice may go some way towards
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the identity-building function discussed above. The fIrst part of the
article argues that public health may properly be described as the type
of practice that provides an arena for the exercise of virtues. This is
followed by an analysis of the three virtues of honesty, courage and
justice, that demonstrates how using a virtue ethics approach helps to
clarify the ethical challenges of public health as well as pointing to
some ways of addressing these.
Public health as an arena for the virtues
MacIntyre has defmed virtues as acquired human qualities or
dispositions that are characterised by three features. First, possession
and exercise of virtues are necessary to enable us to sustain certain
practices and to achieve the goods internal to those practices. Second,
virtues are dispositions that sustain communal identities within which
individuals can seek the good of their own lives. Third, virtues are
dispositions that sustain those traditions which provide both practices
and individual lives with ·their necessary historical context. These
features appear relevant to public health in important ways, and thus
warrant some exploration.
In pursuing this analysis, there is an immediate challenge, that
of defIning public health. One widely accepted defInition is 'Public health
is the science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life and
promoting health through the organised efforts of society. '11 This covers a
large variety of activities, ranging from legally enforceable requirements
such as seatbelt legislation, through to advertising campaigns to
promote the consumption of healthy foods. As well as diverse aims,
public' health uses diverse methods and employs a wide range of
professionals from very different backgrounds. The public health
workforce includes medical, dental and nursing staff; members of
professions allied to medicine; personnel from a variety of disciplines
including epidemiology, biostatistics, economics, health promotion and
community development; managers; research staff and others. The
methods of public health vary from statistical and epidemiological
investigations through to service delivery and evaluations and action
research. Despite this heterogeneity, these activities, professionals and
methods can be coherently drawn under the umbrella of public health
practice by reference to the overarching aims of decreasing morbidity
and mortality. No matter whether it is an epidemiologist tracking the
links between exposure to environmental toxins and certain diseases,
or a community worker running a program of activities for pre-school
children, they share the aim of preventing disease, prolonging life or
promoting health. Once we add the caveat that these activities take
place through the organised efforts of society, rather than as random
acts of philanthropy or private research, we have a fairly wqrkable
defmition of public health that meets MacIntyre's defmition of a
practice.
A practice is a 'coherent and complex form of socially
established co-operative human activity'l2 through which the internal
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goods of the practice are realised in the course of trying to achieve
appropriate standards of excellence. What are the internal goods of
public health? Maclntyre describes goods as internal because such
goods can only be specified in terms of the practice in question, and
can only be identified or recognised by 'the experience of participating in
the practice. '3 For public health, there are a number of goods that seem
to fit these descriptions. These include, for example, identif'ying threats
to health; such as infectious agents or toxins, and containing these;
decreasing infant mortality rates through programs in child and
maternal health; lowering population rates of cardiovascular disease
mortality; or contributions to legislation to ban cigarette smoking in
public places. These kind of goods relate to the aims of public health,
and to its nature in terms of the organised efforts of society. This latter
point is important; the public service aspect of public health is linked to
the more general good of the state taking some responsibility for the
health and wellbeing of its citizens. Whilst those outside public health
can see the good of, for example, containing an epidemic, it' is those
working within public heath who fully understand the challenges and
skills necessary to meet these, and the satisfactions of that particular
job well done.
Part of 'doing the job well' involves reference to standards of
excellence' for that practice, and public health has its own standards of
excellence. This is evident in various ways, such as training
requirements that are necessary before a person is recognised as
professional in their field, the kinds of standards that epidemiologists
use to defme causal relationships in the aetiology of diseases, or best
practice in the use of respectful and robust community consultation
mechanisms prior to the development of new services. There are also
rules in public health that practitioners must adhere to in order to
achieve the relevant goods. These include rules about how to carry out
activities, for example contact tracing, or rules about preserving
confidentiality in data collection.
Seeking the good of one's own life as part of larger communal
identity, and recognising that communal identity as part of a larger
historical tradition, .are important elements in Maclntyre's account.
Does .public health provide this kind of communal identity within a
historical tradition? Just as public health is a recognisable practice,
this in turn creates a kind of communal identity, within which it is
possible for a person to seek to be a good public health practitioner (of
whatever field or discipline). People working in public health can see
themselves as part of an endeavour that exceeds any individual
capacities or actions, yet provides the context in which their own
capacities and actions fonn a coherent narrative, and which also
provides the appropriate standards of excellence to which a practitioner
may aspire. During a life in public health, practitioners may engage in a
variety of activities, with diverse aims (decreasing inequalities in access
to services, ensuring quality of drinking water, developing stroke
rehabilitation programs). The overall purpose of public health, however,
provides a unif'ying theme which serves to explain the intentions behind
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these seemingly disparate activities, and which can be used by the
practitioner to understand the sum of their life's work. This kind of
communal identity is evident in discussions with people working in
public health, who describe themselves as part of a recognisable group
with a clear purpose that differentiates them from' other professional
groups.l4
The historical tradition is strong in public health, playing an
influential role in the communal identity of practitioners. Public health
today has been shaped by the great actors and successes of the past
(identifYing the causes of and controlling infectious diseases, making
the links between poverty and ill-health, developing systems for
measuring the health of the public, improving child health). This is not
to imply that public health is static, adhering to the traditions and aims
of a past era. Like any living tradition, public health is subject to
internal criticisms and debate about its current role and functions, IS
but these debates take place against a tradition of activities aimed at
preventing disease and promoting health. Whatever the differences
between the new public health and more traditional approaches, there
is no suggestion that public health should abandon its aims, and these
debates are informed by the history of public health.
To sum up, if virtues are qualities or dispositions that are
necessary to sustain the internal goods of practices, to sustain
communal identities, and to sustain the traditions that provide
practices and individual lives with necessary historical context, then
virtues are surely necessary to public health. The next section examines
the relationship between the virtues that are necessary to any practice
in relation to some of the ethical challenges of public health.
Honesty, courage, justice and public health
One of the drawbacks of virtue theory is the difficulty of drawing
up a comprehensive and complete list of virtues, necessary to sustain
the practices ana traditions in question. There is a tendency for the
lists to become over-inclusive and hence unwieldy, if not unworkable.
Given this difficulty, there is an attraction in starting with the three
virtues claimed by Macintyre to be necessary to any practice and to see
how these serve public health, acknowledging that this account will
inevitably be incomplete and require some supplementation.
Honesty
Being honest requires us to tell the truth, and this is valued not
only for its practical role in meaningful communication, but also for its
role in building or sustaining trust. Both the practical aspects of
honesty and its trust-related function are important for public health. A
large part of public health revolves around communication: advising of
risks and how to minimise them, explaining the rationale behind new
initiatives, providing the data to justify interventions and so on. In
practice, the seemingly simple requirement to be honest raises
significant dilemmas in public health.
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One set of dilemmas arises in connection with identifying risks
to the public health and communicating these.!. There may be no clear
cut point at which apparently sporadic' instances of rare cancers, or
congenital defects, or cases of gastroenteritis become a discrete cluster,
linked to a possible cause. Data collection and the often painstaking
processes necessary to prove causal links take time, during which there
is no defmitive answer to questions that the public might like to ask,
about the safety of foodstuffs, or of environmental toxins and so on.
There are risks associated with speaking too soon, as the opportunity
for proving or disproving hypotheses may be lost forever, yet if the
practitioner remains silent, more people may be exposed to preventable
harms while waiting for definitive evidence to accumulate. Perhaps the
virtue of honesty requires the practitioner to explain this situation, with
all its risks and uncertainties, yet this course also has its drawbacks.
The perception amongst public health practitioners is that the media,
politicians and the public, have often low levels of information about
public health, and little understanding of the complexities. These
factors might suggest that remaining silent, if not actually being
dishonest, might be preferable to honesty, in terms of minimising
public alarm and jeopardising scientific investigations.
Another set of dilemmas arise in the more specific context of
providing information for public health programs, for example about
vaccinations or screening tests. How honest should one be about rare
side effects, or the implications of a positive test? Providing
comprehensive information-for example, that if a screening test for
chlamydia is positive then all sexual partners of the person involved will
have to be contacted-may well' deter people from taking the test in the
first place. This could result in the overall failure of the program as an
effective public health measure. Again, silence might seem the
preferable course of action.
There are, however, important reasons why honesty is crucial to
public health. First, not being honest feeds into the vicious cycle of not
providing information for fear of being misunderstood due to low levels
of understanding, due to lack of information in the past. The only way
that low levels of understanding about public health can be improved is
through honest communication and sharing information, albeit with
the recognition that this is not only a long-term task but one that also
requires specific skills and dedicated resources.
Second, honesty may serve to temper the sometimes
paternalistic tendencies of public health. Paternalism does not
necessarily entail frugality with the truth, but a commitment to honesty
lays open the reasons for actions, so that the justification of acting for
'the public good' may be subject to scrutiny. Paternalistic claims of
knowing best can examined in detail by those affected, and challenged
if necessary.
Finally, silence in the face of uncertainty may expose people to
risks that they would otherwise act to avoid, thereby endangering
rather than protecting health and undermining the very aims of public
health. Speaking out may seem to be an unacceptable requirement,
Mcnash Bioethics Review Vel. 23 Ne. I 16 January 2004
especially if the risks are minimal in terms of likelihood and severity of
potential harms, or may in fact cause harms such as anxiety and
psychological distress. However, remaining silent whilst in possession
of relevant information not only undermines the aims of public health,
but also undermines the trust that is essential to effective public
health. Once it is known that information is being withheld, public
health loses much of its credibility and authority. Honesty is an integral
part of building trust, and'as such, plays a key role in the practice of
public health. Honesty also plays an integral role in constituting the
internal goods and communal identity of public health. Finding new
knowledge and communicating this is one of the goods of public health,
so that to be a good practitioner requires an allegiance to truth and
honesty. The tradition of public health could not be sustained in the
absence of honesty, as many of its activities would become meaningless
if, for example, data collections or research results were fabricated, or
populations were not informed of relevant health risks.
Courage
MacIntyre writes of courage: 'We hold courage to be a virtue
because the care and concern for individuals, communities, and causes
which is· so crucial to so much in practices requjres the existence of
such a virtue.'l7 The care and concern involved in public health
requires courage on a number of levels. First, there is the
'straightforward physical courage that may be necessary· to provide
public health services in dangerous conditions, such as during
epidemics. The public health staff involved in identifying the SARS virus
were exposed to danger, leading to deaths that were directly related to
the practice of public health. Initially, personnel may not have been
aware of the level of risk, but this soon became apparent. Courage is
also required in other areas of public health-for example, people who
provide abortion services in some parts of the world do so at high risk
of personal danger.
Next, there is the courage that may be necessary to confront
powerful interests; be they professional, political or commercial. It is
part of the role of public health to speak out if threats to the public
heB.Ith have been identified, even though this may lead to harms to the
person involved. These harms can range from professional undermining
or intimidation, damage to careers, or in more extreme cases, physical
danger. The category of speaking out includes whistle-blowing, which is
an activity with known risks to the career of the whistle-blower."
Part of the reason why courage is necessary in public health
relates to the political nature of public health, as there are situations in
which political interests conflict with the interests of public health.
Politicians do not necessarily share the same goals as public health,
but wield the power to cut budgets or harm the careers of those who
identify public health risks with political costs. Working in public
health requires the courage to be overtly committed to the aims of
public health, especially if, as discussed below, this includes a
commitment to egalitarianism.
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Another kind of courage is required in persevering in practice in
the face of indifference or hostility. Public health practitioners seldom
receive recognition or appreciation from the populations they serve, as
their work is largely fairly invisible. This puts a different kind of
demand on courage, but it requires a kind of courage to take on a
lifetime of service in public health when other, more publicly valued
and recognised options are available. Courage is also required to be
honest, to open up the decision-making processes to scrutiny, and to
be prepared to defend unpopular decisions with reasons that can be
justified by appeal to the good of public health.
As with honesty, courage is integral to sustaining public health
at all levels. Part of the traditional identity of public health practitioners
is that of fearless protector of the disadvantaged, taking on foes as
necessary to attain this end. People who are fearful, of their standing or
career, risk being ineffective actors and thereby failing in the aims of
public health. This failure occurs not only at the level of realising the
internal goods of public health, but also does damage to the communal
identity of public health and strikes at its traditions. Public health
would not be the practice it is without the courage of some of its heroes.
Courageous examples provide ideals for current practitioners, and
knowing that one has acted courageously in the traditions of the best
public health, can provide support and meaning to practitioners who
may be at risk for their actions.
Justice
Justice is the third virtue considered necessary by Maclntyre for
all practices. As conceptions of justice and allegiance to these are partly
constitutive of practices and their traclitions, the virtue of justice plays
an important role. l • What conception of justice is there in public
health? Given the almost invariable restrictions on funding, one of the
main ways that justice is played out in public health is in resource
allocation decisions. Public health practice often involves weighing up
the resourceS to be allocated to competing, but equally needy groups.
Traditionally, utilitarian reasoning has dominated, whereby the action
likely to bring the greatest amount of benefit and the least amount of
harm to the most people is chosen over other alternatives. As well as
the drawbacks of utilitarianism outlined in the introduction, the
utilitarian distribution of resources takes no account of the degree of
inequality that may result from its distributions. Increasing attention is
now focussed upon the role of inequalities in the genesis of poor
health.'o A large part of public health is to do with identifying patterns
or c1istributions of health and illness, and from the very fIrst, such
patterns have demonstrated the close links between poverty and ill
health.
These two factors-the decreasing power of the utilitarian
calculus, and the growing recognition of inequalities in poor health-
suggest an evolving role for justice in public health. Against making
population gains in, for example, heart disease, diabetes or cancer,
justice requires that public health practitioners examine the likely
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impact of any proposed interventions on the least well off, and on any
existing inequalities. Brock argues that there are at least two
justifications for giving priority to the worse off. First, the worse off a
person is, the greater the relative benefit any intervention is likely to
provide. Second, giving priority to the least well reduces their
undeserved reduction in health-related quality oflife.21 A full account of
egalitarian theories of justice in public health is beyond the scope of
this paper,however, Daniels has offered an equality of opportunity
account in which justice requires that, as far as possible, all people
have an equal opportunity for lifetiffie health.22
The processes of justice are equally important. Even if there is
agreement on overall distribution patterns, the way that decisions are
made must also be just. Having transparent and accountable decision
procedures will help to ensure that people are treated fairly within the
set parameters. Acting justly requires us to treat equals equally;
discrimination or favouritism should have no place in public hea,lth.
The often arms-length relationship between public health and the
populations it serves may be an advantage in achieving even-
handedness, in contrast to the more personal relationships that occur
in other forms of health care.
Justice sustains public health at a number of levels. First of all,
if we take an egalitarian position, acting to improve the health of the
least well off leads both to direct health benefits, and to reductions in
the health gaps between rich and poor. The direct health benefits are
central goods of public health. Reducing the health gap leads to what
many consider fairer outcomes, as well as fitting with the public health
tradition of caring for the needs of the most vulnerable groups in
society. The powers of public health are considerable, so that using
these justly is necessary to avoid imposing unfair burdens on those
who may suffer discrimination from other sources. Fair decision
procedures allow practitioners to make and live with the hard decisions
that have to be' made. Controlling resources and denying some people
the treatment that they seek can be an onerous responsibility, and one
that often receives little thanks. Having just processes can help to
ensure that these responsibilities are more comfortable to bear.
Criticisms of virtue theory
There are several general criticisms of virtue theory, some of
which may be levelled at this account.23 First, what I have sketched out
here is by no means a complete account of all of the virtues in public
health. Other authors have suggested lists of virtues specific to public
health, induding, honour, patience, modesty, righteous indignation at
poverty, commitment to environmental issues and sustainable health
care, and sensitivity to conflicts between the needs of individuals and
those of communities.24 One could add others, such as compassion,
wisdom, prudence and temperance, all of which would be desirable in
public health practitioners. Given the diverse range of activities and
professionals gathered into the public health enterprise, it may well be
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impossible to define all of the desirable virtues for all of the actors in
public health (or any other practice), but this does not detract from the
importance to public health of the virtues described here. What this
account has tried to do is to demonstrate that public health is a
practice that can be sustained by the virtues of honesty, courage and
justice, such that internal goods cannot be realised in their absence,
nor the traditions maintained.
More serious is the charge that a focus on character and
motivations, rather than the outcomes of actions, may ignore important
moral consequences. Honesty, for example, in publicising health risks
specific to particular communities, may serve to stigmatise those
communities rather than secure for them the resources necessary to
tackle their problems. This kind of criticism does not take account of
the need to balance the virtues, in the understanding that all of the
virtues, rather than one alone, are necessary for good actions. Honesty
tempered with justice might suggest ways of using information about
health risks to support rather than undermine communities.
The virtues alone do not provide a complete account of
morality;25 we also need to know what the good of the practice in
question is, or what a person ftlling the role of public health practitioner
has as their aims. In general terms, the good of public health is given
by its defmition of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting
health. This is a moral aim, given the necessity of health to human
flourishing, and the limited opportunities which result from ill health.
As discussed above, the virtue of justice requires grounding in a theory
of justice, and I have suggested that a version of egalitarianism may be
suitable.
If virtues are acquired through training and exposure to role
models, we need people in public health who are honest, courageous
and just. Lists of ideal virtues can be lengthy, making the requirement
for role models to instantiate all of the virtues hard to meet. A person
bearing all of the virtues in the list above would be a true paragon.
However it does not seem onerous to require our public health
practitioners to have the three virtues described here, and we may well
be suspicious of practitioners who are dishonest, cowardly or unfair.
Exposure to virtuous role models will not necessarily guarantee
virtuous conduct in their students, but no form of moral instruction
can guarantee this. Being explicit however, about moral expectations in
public health, may serve to strengthen communal identity and build
high standards of conduct into public health in a robust and
meaningful way.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that MacIntyre's account of practices
and virtues can make a valuable contribution to public health ethics.
Defming public health as a practice with a communal nature and
strong traditions linked to a set of virtues may help to forge a strong
moral identity for public health that will help to address some of the
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current challenges. Acting in accordance with the virtues discussed
here will not automatically resolve the ethical dilemmas of public
health. Public health is complex, both practically and morally,
mitigating against simple solutions from any moral theory, be that
virtue theory, deontology or consequentialism. However, the approach
taken here captures morally important elements of public health and
helps to maintain awareness of significant moral values in the practice
of public health, not only with regard to the consequences of decisions,
but also with regard to the processes. This awareness is crucial in
maintaining the integrity, and hence, the trustworthiness of public
health. The work of linking this account to a theory of justice remains
for another time.
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